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Executive control of government is generally not a long-term job. In such cases, relatively short 
executive tenure should be expected to play an important role in determining the degree to which 
policymakers internalize the future costs associated with their current fiscal behavior. The effects of 
policymaker’s expected planning horizons on macroeconomic outcomes, however, have been difficult 
to model outside of a fixed term limit context due to the unobserved likelihood of remaining in office, 
along with potential endogeneity problems where re-election campaigns can be enhanced with generous, 
deficit financed expenditures in election years. From a globally representative sample of 79 countries 
over a 32 year period (1980-2012), this paper provides empirical evidence suggesting that incumbent 
governments who know that will not be in office in the following period with a probability of one, are 
found to generate significantly higher deficits in a linear discounting model, and are found to produce 
the least responsible fiscal outcomes where the likelihood of re-election is around fifty percent in 
quadratic discounting models. 
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1. Introduction 
Historically unprecedented increases in the use of peacetime deficit financing has led to a 
persistent accumulation of government debt throughout the 1970s into the 21st century in both 
advanced and emerging economies. The financial crisis of 2008 amplified the cumulative effects 
of this borrowing, with gross government debt to GDP ratios reaching well over 100 percent in 
many advanced economies, yet, austerity efforts remain a slow, variable, and politically difficult, 
process. In order to better explain the large degree of cross-country variability in fiscal 
performance, a great deal of literature has explored institutional and behavioral features of the 
financial decision making process in government (Barro 1973; Roubini and Sachs 1989; Poterba 
1996 Perotti and Kontopoulos 2002). Tsebelis’s veto-players, and Weingast and Shepsle’s 
application of the tragedy of the commons/common pool resource, problem have been shown to 
generate significant negative effects on fiscal outcomes through inefficiencies created in the 
budget process (Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen 1981; Roubini and Sachs 1989; Franceze 2007, 
2009; Alesina et al 1999; Tsebelis and Chang 2004; Hallerberg et al. 2007, 2009; Wehner 2010). 
Theoretical and empirical applications have also emphasized slow adjustment effects generated 
by large numbers of veto players, as well as suboptimal budget size and debt accumulation, from 
the ‘Law of 1/N’.  
There have also been a small collection of theoretical and empirical contributions considering 
finite planning horizons of politicians, where exogenous or probabilistic tenure is expected to 
generate negative inter-temporal consequences for fiscal outcomes, as political actors fail to fully 
internalize the costs of future burdens, or use them strategically against their successors (Alesina 
and Tabellini 1989; Persson and Svensson 1989; Besley and Case 1995; Debrun and Kumar 
2007). The potential endogeneity of expected tenure (governments pursuing deficit spending to 
increase probability of re-election) has, however, made it difficult to estimate these discount rate 
effects on fiscal performance outside of a fixed term limit framework (i.e. US states – see Besley 
and Case 1995; Carey 1996; Alt and Rose 2009).  
Using a large and globally representative unbalanced panel of 79 countries over a 32 year period 
(1980-2012), this paper is the first to empirically test for the effects of latent finite planning 
horizons (probabilistic tenure) on fiscal balances. This is accomplished by using expected 
electoral loss probabilities based on the recent work of Kayser and Lindstadt (2015). The 
findings confirm Barro’s tax smoothing theory, and show further evidence of both temporal and 
inter-temporal fragmentation effects predicted by the common pool resources problem literature. 
With respect to planning horizons, incumbent governments who know that will not be in office 
in the following period with a probability of one, are found to generate between 0.64% and 
1.05% higher deficits (as a % of GDP) in a linear discounting model, and are found to produce 
the least responsible fiscal outcomes where the likelihood of re-election is around fifty percent in 
quadratic discounting models.  These results compliment the work of Debrun and Kumar (2007) 
who find that government stability has a significant effect on cyclically adjusted primary 
balances in a sample of eighteen EU countries over the 1990 – 2004 period. The significance of 
these findings raises questions about the propensity for policymakers to behave with fiscal 
irresponsibility as a result of the most fundamental aspect of democratic institutions: executive 
transitions.  
Part 2 of this paper will discuss existing literature on fiscal deficits and finite planning horizons 
of policymakers. The data will be reviewed in part 3, and Part 4 will test for within-country 
effects of probabilistic tenure on fiscal performance taking into account the difficulties that come 
with unobserved transition probabilities. Part 5 will conclude. 
2. Fiscal Deficits and Executive Planning Horizons 
From previous literature, there are at least two ways in which to formally characterize the 
relationship between expected executive tenure and fiscal performance. Firstly, where incumbent 
governments face an exogenously given probability of being in office at time t+1 which is less 
than unity, the likelihood that they will use public debt as an instrument to influence successive 
administrations discretionary budgeting powers is expected to increase (Alesina and Tabellini 
1989; Persson and Svensson 1989; Devereux and Wen 1998; Debrun and Kumar 2007). This 
should lead to larger fiscal deficits in years where there exists a high expected probability that 
the executive in office in period t, will not be in office in period t+1. Secondly, it is possible that 
the same executive may attempt to use fiscal policy as a campaigning devise, increasing 
government expenditures in years where the probability of a transition is high in order to ‘buy 
back’ myopic voters. These two scenarios make it difficult to separate out whether a defeated 
executive generated high levels of debt to constrain their successor, or, a winning executive was 
successful because of deficit financed increase in political support. From a theoretical 
perspective, an easy solution would be to exogenously fix the probability of remaining in office 
in order to concentrate on the fiscal discount effect with comparative statics.  
Alesina and Tabellini take on such an approach proposing a model where citizen disagreement, 
rather than myopia, influences fiscal policy in democracies. Two parties are assumed to choose 
the same levels of taxation and public consumption (private consumption-leisure tradeoff are 
equal under both parties), but differ with respect to preferences for the composition of public 
goods. The incumbent government's objective functions is time separable into an intra-period 
problem of choosing taxes and provision of public goods for a given deficit (static), and, an inter-
temporal problem of choosing the size of the deficit (dynamic). This inter-temporal fiscal 
decision is influenced by the (exogenous) probability of the executive remaining in office in 
future periods as well as the distance between the preferences of incumbents and successor 
administrations. For example, a conservative incumbent who knows with a high probability that 
they will lose power to a liberal successor, can strategically use deficit spending on their 
preferred composition of expenditures in order to constrain their successors ability to provide its 
preferred composition. In equilibrium, policymakers set their marginal utility of leaving debt to 
the future equal to the time discounted expected marginal cost of inheriting that debt tomorrow. 
This implies that incumbents, who have low expectations of inheriting future debt, will fail to 
internalize the inter-temporal distortions created by running large deficits. Governments who 
discount the future at higher rates than the general public will run larger than optimal deficits in 
order to increase expenditure on their preferred bundle of public goods at time t while 
constraining future governments from spending on their less preferred compositions at time t+1 . 
Alternatively, a social planner with infinite horizons (re-appointed with probability of one), 
adopts a social welfare maximizing weighted average of the preferences of the citizens and 
balance the budget in every period (Alesina and Tabellini 1990). From this, it should be expected 
that high degrees of polarization between party preferences, and low levels of probabilistic 
executive tenure to generate sub-optimal fiscal outcomes and relatively higher levels of 
equilibrium debt (ceteris paribus).  
Persson and Svensson (1989) take on a similar approach, but assume policymakers to possess 
different preferences for the level, rather than composition of, government expenditure. Finite 
horizon governments are confronted with a trade-off between two types of distortions: volume 
distortions, which occur where government consumption is higher than the optimal level 
preferred by that government, and; inter-temporal distortion, which occurs where, for a given 
level of public consumption, the time profile of taxes differs from the ex-ante optimum solution. 
Assuming that policymakers are forward looking, strategic, and the volume of inherited debt has 
an effect on newly elected governments taxation and spending decisions, ‘stubborn’ incumbents 
who put a significant amount of weight on minimizing volume distortions relative to inter-
temporal distortions should be expected to borrow more than it would if it had infinite planning 
horizons (Persson and Svensson 1989). This is to say that governments who know with some 
non-zero probability that they will hand over power to a new administration with different 
preferences for levels of government consumption, will chose to leave a deficit/surplus in order 
to force its successor to spend less (in the case of a conservative government) or more (in the 
case of a liberal government). Again, the ideological distance between current and expected 
future incumbents, as well as probabilistic tenure of the current executive, are both expected to 
generate significant distortionary effects on fiscal outcomes. 
Treating the probability of remaining in office in the next period as exogenously given assumes 
away the possibility that it is partially dependent on fiscal behavior of the incumbent, which can 
influence the longevity of their tenure in office (Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen 1981; Ferejohn 
and Krehbiel 1987; Dewan and Myatt 2010). For example, policymakers may use deficit 
financing strategically to increase their perceived relative performance in close elections (Milesi-
Ferretti and Spolaore 1994) or may ‘bring home the bacon’ by securing discretionary earmarked 
funds for their constituencies (Stratmann 2012). In order for this phenomenon to hold there must 
exist some degree of fiscal illusion, and/or a low degree of fiscal transparency, where voters do 
not fully internalize the inter-temporal budget constraint of the government and therefore 
overestimate the benefits of current expenditures relative to the future tax burden (Alt and Lassen 
2006). Opportunistic office seeking politicians can take advantage of this illusion/lack of 
transparency by deficit financing new spending (without increasing taxation) in order to buy 
public support in years where the probability of an executive transition is high (Alesina and 
Perotti 1995). The probability of being in office in the next period, and thus the degree to which 
policymakers internalize future distortionary burdens, can therefore both affect, and, be affected 
by, fiscal outcomes. Political parties will discount the future to the extent that they believe they 
will no longer be in power, however, their likelihood of remaining in power can be influenced by 
expansionary fiscal policy. This endogeneity problem has made it difficult for researchers to 
measure the effects of expected tenure (outside of a fixed term limit context) on fiscal outcomes. 
Where incumbents use fiscal maneuvering as a strategic device to win an election, we would 
expect deficits to be highest in the midst of close elections where both incumbent and opposition 
parties stand a good chance of winning, whereas; for incumbents who form their fiscal policy 
based on expectations of future tenure in the executive, we would expect high deficits where the 
likelihood of re-election is very low.   
The small number of empirical contributions thus far have either worked within the context of 
fixed term limits (Besley and Case 1995; Carey 1996; Zupan 1991; Alt and Rose 2009) or have 
ignored the endogeneity of expected tenure, focusing instead on exogenously given levels of 
government stability or average tenure (Debrun and Kumar 2007; Edwards and Tabellini 1991) 
From a fixed term limit context, Besley and Case (1995) find evidence that exogenously imposed 
term limits have a significant effect of fiscal policy outcomes in US gubernational elections over 
the 1950-1986 period. The results suggest that governors who are ineligible to stand for election 
in the following period are found to generate higher levels of sales taxes (7-8$ per capita on 
average), income taxes (9$ per capita on average) and state expenditure (15$ per capita on 
average). Alt and Rose (2009) build on these results within the context of US elections across 
forty-five US states between 1974 and 1999 in a principal-agent framework which considers the 
relationship between real fiscal outcomes and two focal areas of ‘incentives’ and ‘ability’. Their 
results suggest that states, whose approval rating ranges between 40-60 percent1, show a 
statistically significant pattern of per capita spending which is estimated to be 38$ higher in 
election years (relative to midpoint of election cycle).  Outside of a fixed term limit framework, 
Debrun and Kumar (2007) find evidence from a sample of 18 European Union economies over 
the 1990-2004 period, that decreases in government stability (which they dub a “plausible proxy 
of the risk faced by an incumbent of being voted out”) generates negative effects on cyclically 
adjusted primary balances (CAPB) to the extent that very unstable governments will, on average, 
run one percent of GDP higher CAPB than very stable ones (ceteris paribus). Finally, Edwards 
and Tabellini (1991) find some support for a positive relationship between fiscal deficits and the 
frequency of government changes for a sample of 42 developing countries between 1963-1988, 
validating the theoretical expectation that “the policymaker may wish to borrow in excess of the 
optimum, and let his successor ‘pay the bills’.”  
The central theme in all of these studies is the importance of finite horizon policymakers whose 
interest in optimal future fiscal outcomes is influenced by the expected probability that they will 
be in office in time t+1. The theoretical contributions suggest two possibilities: i) as this 
probability increases, incumbent executives are more likely to internalize the future costs of 
deficit financing by generating responsible fiscal outcomes (linear), and, ii) where this 
probability approaches fifty percent, incumbent executives may attempt to win the election via 
expansionary/irresponsible fiscal policy (non-linear). Although little is known about the 
empirical validity of these models (Besley and Case 1995), the sparse evidence thus far has 
                                                          
1 Based on polling data. 
suggested that finite planning horizon effects do exist in the same direction as predicted in the 
theoretical literature, but have not pinned down whether they are based on discount factors 
(linear effects) and/or are used strategically to win elections (quadratic effects).  
Lastly, some of the problems associated with short political horizons in fiscal policymaking have 
been shown to be dampened with the existence of well-defined budget rules (Von Hagen and 
Harden 1995; Poterba 1996; Alesina et al. 1999; Volkerink and De Haan 2001; Hallerberg et al. 
2007, 2009; IMF 2009, 2012, 2014, 2015, 2017; Wehner 2010, IMF 2012, IMF 2017). Along 
with fiscal councils and strong monitoring, these have become popular devices for counteracting 
deficit biases, and achieving greater levels of fiscal responsibility. Based on this literature, it is 
possible that the existence of fiscal rules may help in reducing fiscal indiscipline associated with 
short executive planning horizons.   
3. The Data  
Data on GDP growth, unemployment, inflation and interest rates was taken from the World 
Banks World Development Indicators (WB-WDI) for the years 1980-2012.2 Consolidated central 
government deficits/surplus figures were computed from International Monetary Fund 
Government Finance Statistics Yearbook for the years 1980-2012.3,4 With respect to political 
variables, selection was limited by the scope of the analysis. Ideology is classified into one of 
three categories of left right and center (see World Bank - Database of Political Institutions (DPI) 
2012, p.6-7 for definitions) which is used to compute government polarization as the maximum 
                                                          
2 In cases where data for unemployment and inflation was missing from WDI but available from either the OECD or IMF World 
Economic Outlook database, we replace the missing cells with this data.  
3 For countries who reported fiscal data using accrual accounting, net lending/borrowing is treated as synonymous with 
deficit/surplus throughout this paper. 
4 Government deficit/surplus data was missing from IMF Government Finance Statistics Yearbook for Australia for the years 
1995-1998 which we replace with National Accounts data from the OECD. 
distance (using the left, center, right classification) between the executive party and the three 
largest parties in government. Fragmentation is measured using the effective number of parties in 
the executive. 
Theoretical findings also suggest that ideological affiliation of opposition parties should be 
expected to play a role in the fiscal decisions of the executive where there is a divergence 
between the party currently in power and the party most likely to take office should the 
incumbent lose (i.e. left executive and right opposition, or vice-versa). Where the executive 
expects that a transition of power will also be a transition of government ideology, we might 
expect different fiscal behavior, relative to a transition of power without a change in government 
ideology (Alesina and Tabellini 1989, Persson and Svensson 1989; Testa 2010). In order to 
capture this effect, a variable is computed as the difference between executive ideology and the 
ideology of the main opposition party (both measured on a three-point scale). An additional 
binary variable is then computed equaling one where there is an executive transition and the 
losing incumbent party is predominantly affiliated with liberal/conservative ideology while the 
new executive is affiliated with conservative/liberal ideology (zero otherwise). The raw data for 
this variable is taken from DPI and the variables are coded by the author.  Data for fiscal rules 
(debt and balanced budget) was sourced from the IMF’s Fiscal Rules Database.5  
With respect to a continuous measure of loss probabilities, this paper relies on a modified 
version of the Kayser-Lindstadt method which characterizes unobservable probabilities of a 
swing in power between the largest and second largest party in a government during an election 
year as: 
                                                          
5 Data can be downloaded directly from: http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/fiscalrules/map/map.htm 
𝑠𝑡 = (∆𝜈1𝑡)𝜂1
∗ − (∆𝜈2𝑡)𝜂2
∗                                
Where ∆𝑣𝑞𝑡 measures the vote share difference for party q between time t+1 and time t: 
(𝜈𝑞,𝑡+1 − 𝜈𝑞𝑡), and, 𝜂𝑞
∗  measures the (time constant) vote-seat elasticities.6 Given that 𝜈𝑞,𝑡+1 is 
unknown and unobservable for each district, the authors map past swings from previous periods 
beginning at n = 1 through t-1, into a loss function which is used to estimates the probability of 
an electoral swing (𝑔: {𝑠𝑛}1
𝑡−1 → 𝑓(𝑠)). The sparsity of elections over a relatively short time 
period, lead the author to smooth the series via a standard normal kernel density function: 
𝐾∅(𝑠) = 𝜙(𝑠). From this, it is possible to estimate the probability of a plurality shift as: 
𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡
∗ = ∫ 𝐾∅(𝑠) 𝑑𝑠
−𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑐
−∞
                            
Where 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑐 is the proportional advantage in seats held by the incumbent party relative to the 





; where, TP = total parties in parliament). See 
Kayser and Lindstadt (2015) for more detailed discussion. Within this paper, feasible options 
for votes shares (𝜈1𝑡 and 𝜈2𝑡)7 in our broader sample of countries, were computed as: a) 
aggregate vote shares of the largest governing party minus largest opposition party, or: b) 
aggregate vote shares of the entire governing coalition minus the combined opposition vote 
shares (where this differs from a)). Standard normal kernel density functions 𝐾ℎ(𝑠) for both a) 
and b) were then estimated. From this, 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡
∗  estimates can be easily computed given 
threshold values computed using 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑐, 𝑆𝑜𝑝𝑝, and ∑ 𝑠𝑖
𝑇𝑃−2
𝑖=3 .  To get an idea of the relationship 
                                                          
6 For example, in a two party system where 𝜂𝑞
∗ =1 (q=1,2) and party 1 gains 10 seats while party 2 loses 10 seats, our 
swing (𝑠𝑡) would be 20. 
7 See Appendix A.  
between the two measures, Figure 1 belw shows a simple scatter plot between the K-L district 
level data and the aggregate estimates from our a).    
Figure 1: Aggregate and District Level Kayser-Lindstadt Loss Probabilities 
 
Source: Kayser-Lindstadt (2015) and authors calculations 
As expected, the aggregate measure of loss probabilities is skewed towards zero given the 
narrower domains on which the likelihoods are estimated. Effectively, this means that the district 
level densities will give some non-zero probability of executive turnover to very unlikely swings 
while the aggregate levels densities will assign these zero probabilities. There was sufficient 
information on all dimensions for a globally representative unbalanced panel of 83 countries 
spanning the 1980-2012 period. A list of variables and summary statistics is available in 
Appendix B. 
4. Estimation  
This paper begins with a standard fixed effects model, regressing central government fiscal 
balances on a common set of tax smoothing and political variables, including fiscal rules and the 
binary event of an election. Common pool resource and veto player theory suggest that, both 
size, and fragmentation should have directional (temporal) and volatility (inter-temporal) effects 
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on government balances (Tsebelis 2002; Chang and Tsebelis 2004; Franzese 2007). In the case 
of the common pool resource problem, we should expect an increase in the number of 
meaningful actors in the budget process to increase the temporal deficit bias of government as 
these actors fail to fully internalize the cost of their decisions. We should also expect that, as 
more decision makers are included in the budget process, the likelihood of a consensus move 
away from the status quo will decrease, making it more difficult to implement intertemporal 
changes in fiscal outcomes (Chang and Tsebelis 2004; Franzese 2010; Blais et al. 2010). 8From 
this, the equation for central government surplus can be specified as:9 
                                                      𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿(𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡) + 𝑷𝒊𝒕𝜷 + 𝑿𝒊𝒕𝜽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                      (1) 
Where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the surplus/deficit or net lending/borrowing as a percentage of GDP in country i at 
time t and 𝛼𝑖 is an unobserved intercept for country i. The first term on the right hand side is a 
binary indicator equaling one in years where an executive election taking place.10 𝑷 and 𝑿 are 
matrices capturing all other political and macroeconomic determinants, respectively, including 
intertemporal effects11 and the existence of balanced budget and debt rules, on central 
government fiscal balances. 𝛿, 𝜌𝑙 , 𝜌𝑖  , 𝜷, and 𝜽 are unknown parameters/vectors of parameters to 
be estimated. 
                                                          
8 Effectively, this means that we should expect i) larger deficits in countries with larger and more fractionalized sets of 
meaningful decision makers in the budget process, and ii) slower adjustments as the number of veto players and their ideological 
distance increases. 
9 It should be noted that electoral system are not included in equation (1) as these are absorbed in the country fixed effects (as is 
the case of any other time invariant country characteristics over the sample period). 
10 This variable equals one where there is a parliamentary election in parliamentary systems or where there is a presidential 
election in a presidential system (source: WB-DPI) 
11 Specifically, this includes central government balances lagged by one period (𝑦𝑖𝑡−1) and interaction term between lagged 
central government balances and parties in government (𝑝𝑖𝑔).This interaction term is measured with absolute values of central 
government balances as veto player theory argues that as their numbers of meaningful actors increases, this should constrain the 
magnitude, not direction, of year-on-year changes in fiscal performance (Tsebelis 2002; Chang and Tsebelis 2004; Franzese 
2007, 2010) This is a slight modification from the specifications in Franzese (2007, 2010) and Blais et al (2010), but is consistent 
with their theoretical expectations (See Blais et al. (2010) Figure 1). Note that the inclusion of an intercept term would have 
multicollinearity issues (with lagged central government balances). The exclusion of an intercept term effectively assumes that it 
is zero, which was confirmed by the data. 
The results from three specifications are given below in Table 1. The first and second build on 
past theoretical and empirical findings from equation (1). The third specification includes three 
additional indicator to test the Persson and Svensson (1989) hypothesis that ideological 
differences between the incumbent and opposition party will lead incumbents to ‘restrain’ future 
policy options. The first two indicators are binary variables representing right and left wing 
executives (relative to center). The third indicator measures the ideological distance between the 
executive branch of government and the largest opposition party on a three-point scale 
(left/center/right). For example, where the executive is predominantly right (left) wing and 
opposition is predominantly left (right) wing, this indicator will take on a value of -3 (3), while a 
left executive-left opposition or right executive – right opposition combination would produce a 

























Table 1: Within Country Determinants of Central Government Balances (1980-2012) 
(Fixed effects with cluster robust standard errors in parenthesis) 
Variables Central Government Balances (%GDP) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
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Countries 83 83 79 
Observations 1306 1300 1197 
R2 (within) 0.46 0.48 0.48 
R2 (between) 0.90 0.95 0.94 
R2 (overall) 0.64 0.70 0.70 
  *- p<0.10; ** - p<.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
Consistent with past findings, the evidence in Table 1 suggests that levels of central government 
fiscal balances during the 1980-2012 period are largely determined by fiscal inertia, political and 
economic circumstances. As would be expected in Barro's tax smoothing framework, 
unemployment and debt service costs significantly reduce fiscal surplus's/increase deficits, while 
GDP growth has a robust and significant positive effect on fiscal balances. The number of parties 
appears to have significant temporal and intertemporal effects on fiscal balances. The negative 
temporal effects confirm past results regarding the ‘Law of 1/N’ where an increase in the number 
of meaningful actors (parties) in the budget process leads to larger deficit bias (common pool 
resource problem). This finding supports the findings of Volkerink and DeHaan (2001) who find 
that the effective number of parties and number of cabinet ministers generate significant positive 
effects on government debt accumulation in a sample of twenty-two OECD countries for the 
earlier 1971-1996 period.  The positive intertemporal effects (interaction with lagged fiscal 
balances) suggest that an increase in meaningful actors in the budget process (veto players) 
decreases rates of adjustment or ability to implement large reforms (expansionary or 
contractionary). These results are consistent with past theoretical expectations and findings from 
Franzese (2007, 2010) and Blais et al (2010), where single party governments are free to pursue 
high magnitude expansionary or contractionary policy whereas multiparty governments face 
more pressure to converge on more watered down changes in fiscal balances. There is also 
evidence to support Persson and Svensson (1989) where conservative incumbents are expected to 
run lower deficits which tend to increase where there exists a liberal opposition, and; liberal 
governments expected to run higher deficits which tend to decrease given a conservative 
opposition. Column 3 of Table 1 suggests that right leaning executives will tend to run 0.73% 
lower deficits, and left wing governments will tend to run 0.01% higher deficits (both relative to 
center governments); however, where right/left executives are confronted by left/right leaning 
oppositions, these deficits will increase/decrease by 0.22*3 = 0.66%. For example, if we assume 
that central leaning government tend to run a balanced budget, we would expect a right wing 
government, who believes that their most likely successor is of a similar ideology, will tend to 
run a 0.73% surplus, while a right wing government who believes that their successor is of a left 
leaning ideology will tend to run a 0.07% (0.73 - 0.66) surplus. Lastly, it appears that countries 
can dampen the effects of irresponsible fiscal policy by creating binding constraints in the form 
of a balanced budget rule.12 The magnitude of this effect on fiscal balances (between 0.71 and 
0.91 percent of GDP) is more than sufficient to offset the indiscipline resulting from election 
year effects (between -0.37 and -0.40 percent of GDP). 
While there appears to be a significant correlation between election years and central 
government fiscal balances, the planning horizons literature suggests that the 'true' effect on 
fiscal performance is generated through the expected probability of remaining in office in year 
t+1 rather than a simple binary indicator for whether an election or transition took place. It 
should be expected that, where an executive transition does take place with an a priori expected 
low likelihood of occurrence, these governments will be more likely to internalize the costs of 
future debt and generate lower deficits than incumbents who perceive a high a priori likelihood 
of a transition. In such cases, the estimates from (1) will be biased upwards as they assume that 
all transitions were fully known to those who left office. Past findings of significant election year 
effects (Debrun and Kumar 2007; Wehner 2010) may be a reflection of this probability, but like 
the binary transition indicator, is also measured with error. The inability to observe a continuous 
likelihood of executive transition, along with the potential for expected planning horizons to be 
incorporated into fiscal policy for a variety of reasons (see theoretical discussion), makes it likely 
that our binary election indicator in equation (1) may not generate accurate results.  
                                                          
12 The author also ran a series of specifications interacting loss probabilities with fiscal rules (balanced budget) to 
test for any effects of conditional effects. None of these were significant. 
Based on the theoretical discussion in Section 2, the unobserved continuous likelihood of 
remaining in office should have a significant impact on the degree to which current policymakers 
internalize future burdens of irresponsible fiscal policy. From this, the error term in equation (1) 
will be correlated with this unobserved likelihood. To make this point clear, we can assume the 
'true' equation for central government fiscal balances is:  
       𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜆(𝑝𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡
∗ ) + 𝑷𝒊𝒕𝜷 + 𝑿𝒊𝒕𝜽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                (2) 
Where 𝑝𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡
∗ ~[0,1] is the ‘true’ continuous unobserved probability of an executive transition 
in country i at time t. Because 𝑝𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡
∗   is a latent variable, equation (1) estimates the effect of 
executive planning horizons with some uncertainty (𝑝𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝜐𝑖𝑡).  
Substituting this back into equation (2) gives, 
       𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜆(𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡) + 𝑷𝒊𝒕𝜷 + 𝑿𝒊𝒕𝜽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡              (3) 
suggesting that 𝑐𝑜𝑣[𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡,(𝜀𝑖𝑡 − 𝜆𝜈𝑖𝑡)] = −𝜆𝜎𝜈
2 ≠ 0  which makes the parameter estimates from 
(1) [Table 1] inconsistent (Greene 2008; Wooldridge 2002).  
In our sample of 83 countries over the 1980-2012 period, about half (51%) of all elections result 
in an executive transition. From this, we would expect that the parameter estimate 𝛿 in (1) (and 
Table 1) to underestimate the true effect 𝜆 from (2), as the former includes incidence where the 
likelihood of an executive transition is very low, giving the incumbent no incentive to create a 
future burden than they themselves will have to bear. With the additional possibility that 
governments may use fiscal policy as a device to increase their popularity in closely contested 
election, there may also exist a non-linear relationship between transition probabilities and fiscal 
performance. Prior to addressing this problem, however, it is important to define 𝑝𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠.
∗ 
To get a more accurate estimate for 𝑝𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡
∗ , we can begin with the work of Kayser and 
Lindstadt (2015).  As noted in the data section, the authors measure electoral risk as a function 
of, i) the expected variability in party level vote share, and ii) the district level seat-vote 
elasticities (which are one-for-one transformations in PR systems). The advantage of this 
approach is the ability to easily estimate the likelihood of electoral defeat/victory which “enjoys 
exogeneity from potential policy related dependent variables” (Kayser and Lindstadt 2015). It is 
important to note, however, that the Kayser-Lindstadt (KL) measure is one of plurality swings, 
rather than executive transitions, but the two will likely be correlated. For example, as noted in 
the paper, “In a two party system, losing plurality status in parliament almost inevitably means 
leaving government, while in multi-party [or non-democratic] systems with coalition 
governments, this is not necessarily the case.”13 So, while Kayser-Lindstadt are fundamentally 
interested in “the expected probability that a plurality party in parliament losses it’s seats 
plurality in the next election”, this paper is interested in the expected probability of a change in 
the executive branch of government at any point in time during their tenure (even if an election 
does not occur). Computing KL for a broader sample of countries, therefor, requires us to assume 
that all executives form expectations about their future tenure based, to some degree, on the 
degree of formal political opposition they face (vote shares). The advantage of this approach is 
the ability to examine executive transitions in a more dynamic environment which includes both 
election and nonelection years from a globally representative sample of countries.  
The disadvantage that comes with broadening the population/sample is not having the manpower 
to compile district level vote-seat data which is required to estimate swing sensitivity in 
multiparty systems (Linzer 2012; Kayser and Lindstadt 2015). One of the most pronounced 
                                                          
13 Kayser and Lindstadt (2015), p.244 
challenges is the relatively small domains on which aggregate kernel densities fall.14 The 
implications of this are narrower estimates of loss probabilities, where a larger proportion of 
elections will be predicted to effectively have a zero probability of a plurality shift (which may 
be true). If we assume that expected plurality shift likelihoods are good exogenous 
representatives of executive transitions (𝑝𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡
∗ ≈ 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑟
𝑖𝑡
) , their effect on central government 
balances can be directly estimated in two ways:15 
                                            𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜆(𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡) + 𝑷𝒊𝒕𝜷 + 𝑿𝒊𝒕𝜽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                 (4a) 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜆1(𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡) + 𝜆2(𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡)
2𝑷𝒊𝒕𝜷 + 𝑿𝒊𝒕𝜽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    (4b) 
The first specification (4a) includes a linear effect of vote swings which assumes that incumbents 
base fiscal decisions based on their discount factors associated with expectations about 
remaining in office in the future. The second specification (4b) allows for the possibility that 
incumbent will use fiscal policy as an instrument to increase their levels of support in tightly 
competitive situations. In this second case, we would expect deficit spending to be highest where 
𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡
∗  is close to 50%.  
Table 2 below shows estimates for equations (4a) and (4b) with the KL district level data for 
sample of 21 countries over the 1980 – 2008 period (columns 1 and 2), and versions a) and b) of 
𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡  (discussed above) computed from aggregate level data in our sample of 79 countries
16 
over the 1980-2012 period (columns 3 - 6). Columns 1, 3, and 5 show the linear effects of loss 
                                                          
14 Ibid. 
15  𝑝𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡  is included in P. 
16 Single party countries were coded as 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 0. 
probabilities on fiscal balances from (4a), while; columns 2, 4, and 6, show the quadratic effects 
from (4b).        
Table 2: Central Government Balances and Loss-Likelihoods (1980-2012) 
(Fixed effects with cluster robust standard errors in parenthesis) 
 
   Variables K-L District Level 
Sample 
Aggregate Sample (a)  Aggregate Sample (b) 
 linear Quadratic linear quadratic linear quadratic 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 















Central Government Surplus/Deficit 



































































































































































Countries 21 21 79 79 79 79 
Observations 425 425 1197 1197 1197 1197 
R2 (within) 0.68 0.68 0.47 0.48 0.47 0.47 
R2 (between) 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 
R2 (overall) 0.82 0.82 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.70 
    *- p<0.10; ** - p<.05; ***p<0.01 
 
These results are relatively consistent with our baseline findings in Table 1 where fiscal inertia, 
economic circumstances, veto players, and ideological polarization appear to be strong and 
robust predictors of central government fiscal balances. The first two columns show results using 
the KL data for a sample of 21 countries. With respect to loss-likelihoods, the results here are 
relatively uninformative which could be due to the smaller sample sizer or difference in measure 
measurement discussed above. In order to isolate the reason for these insignificant results, we re-
run the regressions from columns 1 and 2, replacing the original KL data with the modified KL 
data for the same sample of countries. As can be seen in appendix A, the results are mixed 
suggesting that there could actually be some merit in working with narrower densities from 
aggregate data.17 The loss likelihood results for our aggregate KL measure appears to have a 
statistically significant linear relationship with fiscal outcomes (central government balances) in 
our full sample of 79 countries providing evidence of a discount effect from executives who 
form fiscal policy based on expectations of remaining in office. The magnitude of this linear 
effect ranges between 0.64% and 1.05% higher deficits (as a percent of GDP) when comparing 
an executive who fully expects to remain in office relative to an executive who fully expects to 
lose it (ceteris paribus). These results suggest that the continuous unobserved likelihood of 
expected executive planning horizons (𝑝𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡
∗ ) are significantly correlated with fiscal balances 
and differ in magnitude from those estimated in (1) where this probability was measured with 
error (𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡 = 𝑝𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡
∗ + 𝜐𝑖𝑡). There is also some evidence of a quadratic effect from our full 
sample of countries where deficits tend to be highest where the expected likelihood of a plurality 
swing are close to fifty percent. We can see this by setting the first derivative of 𝑦  with respect 
to 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑟 from column (4) in Table 2 equal to zero, 
                                                          
17 See Appendix A. 
𝜕𝑦
𝜕𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑟




suggesting that deficits will reach their highest point when the likelihood of a plurality shift is 
around 48 percent. Figure 2 shows the predicted relationship between the unobserved probability 
of an executive transition and fiscal performance measured as central governments 
surplus/deficit as a percentage of GDP from the third and fourth columns of Table 3 (using linear 
and quadratic loss probabilities). Both functional forms predict a statistically significant 
correlation between the likelihood of remaining in office and fiscal balances with somewhat 
greater robustness coming from the linear estimates. 
 
Figure 2: Fiscal Performance and Loss Likelihoods (Linear and Quadratic) 
                                    (1a: linear)                                                      (1b: quadratic) 
         
                                                        Source: author’s calculation from Table 2 
 
Lastly, it appears that the existence of a balanced budget rule can help to offset negative effects 
from distortionary temporal and intertemporal effects on fiscal outcomes. The magnitude of this 
independent effect ranges between 0.66% and 0.77% of GDP, which is nearly sufficient to offset 
the distortionary effects from an incumbent who knows that they will lose office with a 
probability near one (estimated in our linear specifications as ranging between 0.64 and 1.05). 



















































































Estimates are calculated from column 4 of Table 2
on US states (see Rose 2006), we run a separate set of both linear and quadratic equations with 
interactions with the existence of balanced budget and debt rules.18 
Table 3: Dampening Effects of Fiscal Rules? 
(Fixed effects with cluster robust standard errors in parenthesis) 
 
Variables    Aggregate Sample (a) Aggregate Sample (b) 
 linear quadratic linear quadratic 
























































Countries 79 79 79 79 
observations 1197 1197 1197 1197 
R2 (within) 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 
R2 (between) 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 
R2 (overall) 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.70 
                         *- p<0.10; ** - p<.05; ***p<0.01 
The results in Table 3 suggest that, while the existence of a balanced budget rule continues to 
have an independent effect on fiscal performance, there is not a great deal of evidence suggesting 
an interactive dampening effect from either balanced budget or debt rules. 
Relating these results back to our theoretical discussion from Section 2, it appears that there are 
several political/institutional factors which influence budgetary outcomes. Firstly, an increase in 
the number of meaningful actors in the budget process (parties in government) will lead to a 
larger deficit bias, along with a dampening effect any expansionary/contractionary initiatives. 
                                                          
18 Note: the specification is the same as in equations (4a) and (4b). Only result for parameter estimates of interest 
are shown in Table 3. 
These results are generally consistent with the theoretical expectations from past literature 
(Franzese 2007, 2010; Blais et al 2010). Second, executive and opposition ideology both seem to 
have an impact on fiscal outcomes to the extent that surplus generating conservative executives 
will reduce these surpluses when confronted by liberal opposition (vice versa for liberal 
executives confronted by conservative opposition). These, previously untested, results are 
consistent with the theoretical expectations from Persson and Svensson (1989). Thirdly, 
incumbent executives will take into account the continuous expected likelihood of remaining in 
office when making current fiscal decisions to the extent that, executives who fully expect to 
remain in office will tend to run lower deficits/higher surpluses that executives who expect to 
compete for power. Relating this back to the theoretical discussion form Section 2, there is some 
evidence to support incumbents as strategic actors who will use deficit financing to influence 
tight elections, but may return to more responsible fiscal planning where they are certain to lose 
power (right hand side of Figure 2). The more robust linear effects from columns 3 and 5, 
however, suggest that incumbent discount factors linearly determine their level of fiscal 
responsibility, to the extent that the most responsible fiscal outcomes will come from those who 
are certain they will always be in power.     
6. Conclusion 
Persistence negative imbalances since the 1970's has led the academic community to search for 
the causes of unsustainable fiscal imbalances, and potential institutional remedies which might 
structurally induce socially optimal outcomes. Evidence in this paper is found confirming Barro's 
tax smoothing hypothesis, where distortionary burdens are minimized over time with pro and 
counter-cyclical stabilizers, along with the temporal and intertemporal distortions created 
through the veto player hypothesis which predicts that the number of actors in the budget 
formulation process will significantly impact the magnitude of year-on-year flexibility which 
policymakers possess to make fiscal adjustments. While these macroeconomic stabilization and 
veto player/common pool resource findings are consistent with a considerable amount of 
established literature, less emphasis has been given to the finite planning horizons of 
policymakers. 
Existing theoretical contributions have predicted that policymakers, who heavily discount the 
future, will fail to internalize any increases in debt which they can pass off to future 
administrations, effectively constraining their policy choice set. The empirical validity of these 
theoretical expectations has, however, been given limited empirical attention due to the 
difficulties associated with measuring the unobserved discount factors of policymakers and the 
potential for non-linear relationships between fiscal performance and these latent probabilities. 
Characterizing these discount factor, or the likelihood of remaining in office, as a binary 
indicator of an election taking place fails to recognize that incumbents evaluate their chances of 
remaining in office probabilistically. Consistent with these theoretical expectations, this paper 
finds that as the unobserved expected probability of policymakers remaining in office decreases, 
so too does the level with which they internalize the future burdens of fiscal imbalances, to the 
extent that incumbent who know with certainty in time t that they will no longer be in office in 
time t+1 will generate between 0.64% and 1.05% higher fiscal deficits (as a % of GDP) in their 
final year in power than those who know with certainty that they will remain in office (ceteris 
paribus). There is, however, some evidence suggesting that this deficit spending may be more 
reserved for strategic purposes, where incumbents will be most inclined to high deficits where 
they face tight competition to maintain control of the executive. 
The general findings suggest that institutional structure, as well as the objective functions of 
policymakers, do play a significant role in determining fiscal outcomes. While institutional 
problems can be resolved by concentrating power in a small number of ideologically 
homogeneous actors who fully internalize the costs of their budgetary decisions, the problem of 
uncertain tenure strikes deeper at the heart of the constitutional framework under which these 
actors function. The goal then is to devise a mechanism within the institutional bounds of a 
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